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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A. 
OTTESON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA 
SUE MALONE, husband and wife, 
Appellants-Defendants. 
Case No. 15478 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
~TATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from that portion of the judgment 
entered by the trial co~rt denying Appellants' demand for 
specific performance of the option portion of a "Lease and 
Option'' and that portion of the trial court's judgment 
declaring void the option portion of the "Lease and Option." 
Appellants also appeal from the order denying their Motion 
for New Trial and Alternative MOtion to Amend the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Edward 
Sheya, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery 
County on the 7th and 8th of December, 1976. The Respondents 
had filed suit against the Appellants for, among other things, 
relief from the option portion of the "Lease and Option" executed 
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by the Appellants and Respondents and the Appellants had 
counterclaimed for specific performance of the option portion 
of the 11 Lease and Option, 11 The court denied Appellants' moticr 
for specific performance and granted Respondents' plea by 
declaring void the option portion of the "Lease and Option". 
Appellants moved the trial court for a new trial and in the 
alternative for amendment of the Findgings, Conclusions and 
Judgment. These motions were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek judgment declaring their option to 
purchase valid and granting their request for specific per-
formance of said option, Respondents seek affirmation of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and rulings 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 27th, 1974 a document entitled ''Lease and Option" 
was executed by the Appellants and the- Respondents. (Complaint 
Exhibit B), The document purports to grant to the Appellants 
a five year lease of 28 acres belonging to Respondents. In 
addition the document contains an option to purchase same said 
28 acres, 
· eff: A dispute arose between the parties as to the meaning, · 
and validity of the contract, a suit was filed by the Respondent 
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alleging breach of the agreement and asking relief from the 
option, and an answer and counterclaim asking for specific 
performance of the option was filed by the Appellants. The 
Respondents requested a jury trial on April 22, 1976 which 
the Appellants vigorously opposed by motion and rremorandwn. 
The trial court, as a result of Appellants opposition, denied 
Respondents demand for jury trial. The case came for trial 
before the Honorable Edward Sheya, District Judge, sitting with-
out a jury, on the 7th and 8th of December, 1976. The court 
made the following findings based upon the testimony of Ara 
Otteson, Richard D. Malone, Hila Sue Malone, Boyd Bunnell 
and the deposition of Nellie A. Otteson, which was admitted 
in lieu of her attendance at trial due to disability and 
doctors prohibition: 
1. The Court found in its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law beginning with the second paragraph on page 
3 as follows: 
a. That the plaintiff, Ara Otteson is aged, but 
appears to be in good health and of sound and di~posing 
memory, he having testified before the court during the 
course of the trial. From the evidence it appears that 
Nellie A. Otteson, the wife of the plaintiff Ara Otteson, 
is infirm and at the time of trial was totally unable to 
attend the trial do to sickness, disability, age and doctors 
prohibition. 
b, That the defendant Richard D. Malone and Hila 
Sue Malone appear to be youthful in comparison to plaintiffs 
and of normal intelligence. 
-3-
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I 
c. That the home of the plaintiffs lie upon the la:,:ll 
which is subject to the plaintiffs third cause of 
action, the plaintiff Ara Otteson, having farmed it 
with his father as a boy and having been a farmer on 
the said land his entire lifetime, that olaintiff 
Ara Otteson has supported and sustained himself and 
his family over the years by raising crops and animals 
upon said land. 
d. That in the year of 1972 or 1973, the defendan+-' 
in a real estate purchase agreement, purchased from pla 1~'.' 
tiffs, ten acres of land without water, and on June 27th 
1974, the defendants prevailed upon plaintiffs to lease' 
the balance of the acreage which was irrigated land with 
water rights to the defendants, and that after considerabld 
discussion of the subject by the parties, the plaintiffs 
did agree orally, to enter into a lease of the land and 
water rights which had not been sold by plaintiffs to 
defendants; which said land and water rights, located 
in Emery County, State of Utah, is more particularly 
described as follows: 
(description of 28 acres omitted) j 
e. That the plaintiff Ara Otteson, and the defendar· 
Hila Sue Malone, prior to having the lease reduced to writ 
drove in the said defendants automobile from Huntington to 
Price City for purpose of reviewing the con tents of the pre· 
posed lease. The plaintiff, Nellie A. Otteson, was unabl;J 
due to physical disability to go to the meeting at the 0L1 
of Mr. Bunnell, attorney of Price City, nor did the · 
defendant, Richard D, Malone, go to the meeting with 
the attorney Mr. Bunnell. On the way to the meeting 
with the attorney, Mr. Otteson discovered that the 
batteries in his hearing aids were dead, and when his 
hearing aid batteries are dead, he is almost totally 
unable to hear sound or conversation. During the 
meeting with the attorney, Mr Otteson was unable to 
hear any of the discussion or to participate in any of 
the conversation between the defendant Hila Sue Malone 
and Mr. Bunnell. The attorney Bunnell testified at the 
trial that he thought that there was something wrong 
with Ara Otteson, and he, the attorney, thought perhaps 
Mr. Otteson had a stroke because he "acted strange at 
the meeting" which had been arranged by the plaintiff 
Ara Otteson's wife Nellie A. Otteson, by telephone. 
f, That Ara Otteson heard none of the discussion 
at the meeting relative to the preparation of the lease 
between attorney Bunnell and the defendant Hila sue f e 
Malone, and at no time during said conference, or be or 
-4-
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the conference with attorney Bunnell, did either Ara 
Otteson or Nellie A. Otteson, his wife, talk or discuss 
any terms, or even the subject of an option to purchase 
the real estate, either at attorneys Bunnell's office, 
or on any other occasion. 
g. Sometime after the meeting in attorney Bunnell's 
office above-described, the attorney sent a copy of a lease 
he had drafted on the subject property to the olaintiffs. 
The plaintiff Ottesons reviewed the lease and it appeared to 
be substantially correct, except there was reference to an 
option to buy which the plaintiffs concluded meant, since 
they had never discussed any privilege or right in the 
defendants to buy the said acreage, that in the event 
they decided to sell said real estate, that the Malones, 
defendants, would have first right of refusal to buy 
the property, Since the plaintiffs did not intend to 
sell the said acreage, they did not consider the "option 
to buy", which they interpreted to be a first right of 
refusal in the event they, in their sole judgment, 
determined to sell the said property, of any consequence. 
h. Subsequently, they had one or more discussions 
regarding the lease with the Malones, and at no time did 
the defendants Malones, ever mention either the option to 
buy or the meaning of the option to buy, which had been 
inserted in the lease without either the permission or 
advanced knowledge of the plaintiffs. 
i. That it was not until subsequent to a notice 
served upon plaintiffs by defendants indicating that 
the defendant intended to exercise the said option to 
buy the said real estate, that plaintiffs Ottesons 
realized their mistake and failure to appreciate the 
meaning, significance and effect of the words "option 
to buy" which were inserted in the lease by attorney 
Bunnell at the direction of defendant Hila Sue Malone. 
j. That the evidence indicates that the plaintiff 
Ara Otteson thought and believed that the option meant 
that he nevertheless had the right to determine at some 
later time whether or not the property should be sold, and 
that only in such event, that he thereafter decided to sell 
the property, would the defendants have the right of first 
refusal to buy the said property. 
k. Further, plaintiffs, in fact, told the defendants 
-5-
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prior to signing the lease, that they would not, under 
any circumstances, sell the subject land, and at no time 
did they discuss with the defendants or attorney Bunnell i 
an option to buy the said property. 
1. That defendants have not kept the terms of the 
lease in that they have failed to pay lease payments as du' 
water assessment charges due, and property taxes defendant:' 
were requested to pay by terms of the lease. 
2. The court in its memorandum decision beginning 
at the top of page twelve stated as follows: 
The court is not clearly satisfied from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that said option embodies 
the real understanding of the parties, and especially 
of the plaintiff Ara Otteson. The other plaintiff, 
Nellie A. Otteson, was )Jy reason of illness and infirmity, 
unable to attend the trial, and therefore, the court does I 
not have the benefit of her testimony. I 
By reason of the circumstances under which the option I 
was executed, the court is doubtful that the significance c:I 
effect thereof was understood by plaintiffs, and especialli· 
the plaintiff Ara Otteson. The evidence indicates that pla: 
tiff Ara Otteson thought that the option meant that he sti::, 
had the right to determine later whether or not the propert1
1 should be sold, and only in the event that he thereafter 
decided to sell the property, would the defendants have be; 
right of first refusal. Plaintiff Ara Otteson stated he ~ 1 1 
his wife told the Mal ones they wouldn't sell the land and. 
did not discuss the option in the form it appears in the 1"1 
Appellant challenged 
and a motion for new 
the courts finding of fact by motion ~o ~4 
trial which was schedule for hearing in irii 
County on the 20th of September, 1977. On 
September, at the time of hearing, counsel 
Tuesday, the 20th day I 
for the Appellant wa: I 
I 
not present at the hearing. The court after considering the 
matter, denied Appellants motion in all its aspects. 
i 
decisior, 11 Appellant being disatisfied with the trial courts 
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1 
·1 
I 
thereafter pursued this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ABUSE ITS DESCRETION IN 
DENYING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO THE APPELLANTS ON 
THEIR COUNTERCLAIM, 
The Appellants, in this Appeal, take exception with two 
rulings of the lower court; the voiding of the option portion 
of the "Lease and Option", and the denial of Appellant's request 
for specific performance of the option portion of the agreement. 
The Appellants in the body of their argument have failed to 
clearly address the different issues presented by these two 
separate rulings, but rather have lumped the reformation/ 
rescission theories and cases with specific performance 
theories and cases, Respondents will hereinafter focus 
on the court's denial of specific performance believing 
that the Appellant has not properly treated the law with 
respect to that ruling. 
The granting or denying of a bill of specific per-
formance involves a necessarily fact intensive decision 
making process on the part of a trial court. As such, 
the trial court is given a reasonable amount of latitude 
by courts of appeals which may be couched in terms of 
"Judicial Discretion", "Sound Discretion", and the like. 
-7-
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Professor Corbin in his work on contracts at Specific 
Performance, section 1136 discusses the problem of the 
trial court in weighing the numerous factual and legal 
considerations that may be involved in passing judgment 
on a petition for Specific Performance and stated at 
Volume 5 A Page 95 as follows: 
The solving of these problems may require 
the weighing of conflicting evidence, and in the 
end may depend upon matters of opinion that are 
not capable of obvious demonstration. It is in 
these respects that the court has more "discretion" 
in a suit for specific performance than in an 
action for damages, 
The matters to be considered and the amount of discretion 
allowed a trial court in its considerationnof a petition for 
Specific Performance are different from the considerations 
and discretion involved in an action for rescission or cancela· 
tion. Again Professor Corbin, at Specific Performance 
Section 1136 page 96 states: 
While it is going to far to say that granting 
or refusing of a decree is wholly in the discretion 
of the trial court, it is true that, in determining 
the question, a greater variety of facts is to be 
taken into consideration than is the case in an 
action for damages for breach of contract.... . 
Among these facts are the public interest, oppression 
and sharp practice in the formation of a contract, 
inadequacy of consideration, mistake even though 
unilateral in character, hardship that will be 
caused by enforcement, the plaintiffs own breach 
or inequitable conduct. These and other facts, 
either singly or in combination may be sufficient 
to justify a refusal of specific enforcement even 
though they would not be sufficient to constitute 
-8-
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a defe~se t~ an action for damages or even justify 
an affirmative decree for rescission or cancelation. 
This principle of judicial discretion is also well 
recognized by the Utah Court. In Free vs. Little, 31 Utah 
449, 88 P. 407, (1907) and again in McNeil vs. McNeil, 61 Utah 
141, 211 P. 988 (1922) the Utah Supreme Court Stated as follows: 
The right to specific performance depends not 
upon hard fast rules according to which all cases 
are to be_ decided, but each case is dependent upon 
its own peculiar facts and circumstances. While the 
right is to be governed by general rules and principles 
of equity, each case, nevertheless, must be determined 
upon its own inheritant equities. 
After a court of equity has exercised its discretion 
the high court, in reviewing such a decision, should view 
it with considerable deference. In Barber vs. Calder, 522 
P.2d, 700 (1974), the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the 
standard of review in discretionary matters: 
In situations where the exercise of discretion is 
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the 
determination of the trial court, whichever way it goes. 
This is true, because due to his close involvement with 
the parties, the witnesses and the total circumstances 
of the case, he is in the best position to judge what 
the interests of justice require in safeguarding the 
rights and interests of all parties concerned. 
The following are elements of this case upon which the trial 
court's denial of specific enforcement can properly be based: 
1. The significance and effect of the option as executed 
-9-
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was not understood by the Ottesons. 
The trial court, by its affirmative findings of fact 
and statement of the law in its memorandum decision makes 
it clear that it considered the Ottesons' misapprehension 
of the meaning and effect of the option as being of primary 
significance in its denial of specific performance. The 
court, in its memorandum decision beginning at the top 
of page two stated as follows: 
The court is not clearly satisfied from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that said option embodies 
the real understanding of the parties, and especially 
of plaintiff Ara Otteson. The other plaintiff Nellie 
A, Otteson was by reason of illness and infirmity un-
able to attend the trial, and therefore, the Court 
does not have benefit of her testimony. 
_ By reason of the circumstances by which the 
option was executed, the Court is doubtful that 
the significance or effect thereof was understood 
by the plaintiffs, and especially the plaintiff 
Ara Otteson. The evidence indicates that plaintiff 
Ara Otteson thought that the option meant he still 
had the right to determine later whether or not 
the property should be sold, and only in the event 
that he thereafter decided to sell the property 
would the defendants have the right of first 
refusal, Plaintiff Ara Otteson stated he and his 
wife told Malones they wouldn't sell the land and 
did not discuss the option in the form it appeared 
in the lease, 
In 71 Am Jur 2d Pages 79, 80, 81, Sections 53 
and 54, the author states, as far as the court deems 
it applicable to the facts of this case as follows: 
- 10-
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"Inasmuch as specific performance 
will not be granted unless it is in 
accordance with equity and good conscience, 
it is well settled that equity may properly 
and generally refuse to issue a decree of 
specific performance to compel a defendant 
to perform a contract which he entered into 
under mistake in which he would not have 
entered into had he understood its true effect 
_§£ecific performance not being a matter of 
absolute right, equity will refuse to en-
force its performance when not clearly 
satisfied that it embodies the real under-
standing of the parties. Where the circum-
stances under which the contract was executed 
render it doubtful whether the act was under-
stood by the defendant, the Court is justified 
in refusing specific performance. Thus in 
an apppropriate case, a unilateral mistake may 
justify a court of equity in refusing specific 
performance ..•• , ..• 
. . . • . • . . • • Neither is actual 
fraud or intention to defraud necessary 
to defeat the plaintiff's claim for 
specific performance, It is sufficient 
that the mistake is one to which the 
plaintiff by his acts has unintentionally 
contributed. In fact, the plaintiff's 
connection with the mistake is not an 
essential factor. 
While it is well established doctrine that 
equity will not enforce a contract when 
the plaintiff contributed to or induced the 
defendant's mistake or misapprehension, the 
discretion of a court of equity to refuse 
specific performance of a contract entered 
into under mistake, it is not limited to 
cases in which the mistake is induced or 
made probable or possible by conduct, acts, 
or ommissions of the plaintiff. 
Even though the mistake is that of defendant 
-11-
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or his agent and the plaintiff is neither 
directly or indirectly responsible there-
fore, the Court may, and ordinarily will, 
refuse a decree of specific performance 
where the mistake is a material one and 
the enforcement of the contract under the 
circumstances would be inequitable or a 
hardship to the defendant, particularly 
where the plaintiff does not claim to 
have changed his position before he was 
notified of the mistake, or to have 
suffered any loss by reason of having 
entered into the contract. In such cases, 
the court is governed by the principle of 
hardship and unfairness equally with that 
of mistake." 
"By reason of the above, the Court denies the 
defendant specific performance of the option to purchase 
the plaintiff's real property described in the lease 
agreement dated June 27, 1974. Therefore, it is 
unnecessary for the court to make a specific finding 
as to whether a separate consideration was necessary 
for the option. (Emphasis added) 
The court has cited its own authority for its finding 
but there are additional authorities to be found which also 
support the court's action, 81 C,J.S. at page 830, 
Specific Performance Section 50, Subsection (a) reads: 
Specific Performance will ordinarily be denied 
if it is doubtful whether there has ever been a meeting 
of the minds or a full and complete understanding of 
all the essential terms of the contract sought to be 
enforced, Specific Performance will also be denied 
if a misunderstanding as to an important matter is i 
evident or the intention, as expressed, has not been . , r 
understandingly formed because of mistake, misapprehensic.: 
or misrepresentation as to a material matter, in the ' 
absence of which the contract would not have 
-12-
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been entered into. Since in determining specific 
enforceability of a contract, a court of equity 
acts on different principles than where cancelation 
or reformation of a contract is sought, specific 
performance may be denied even though there is no 
such misunderstanding, fraud, or mistake as would 
permit the contract to be canceled or reformed 
(Emphasis added) · 
The clearest statement of this principle in case law 
is found in Chambers vs, Livermore, 15 Mich. 381, (1867), 
in which the Michigan Court stated as follows: 
Specific Performance, even of a binding 
contract, is not a matter of right; and a court of 
equity will refuse it, and turn the complainant over 
to his remedy at law, if not clearly statisfied that 
it embodies the real understanding of the parties. 
At page 138. 
In the case of Pope Manufacturing Company vs. Gormully, 
144 U.S. 224, 36 L,ed 414 (1891) United States Supreme 
Court based its affirmation of a denial of specific 
performance on its determination that the defendant did 
not understand the legal purport of the instrument which he 
signed. The court stated as follows: 
••• Specific Performance is not an absolute right, 
but one which rests entirely in judicial discretion, 
exercised, it is true, according to the settled principles 
of equity and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always 
with reference to the facts of the particular case. 
(citing cases) 
•• ,Indeed, the operation of these covenants upon 
his ligitimate business was such that it is hardly 
possible he could have understood their legal purport •... 
We have not found it necessary to go into the details 
of this testimony. While we are not satisfied that his 
assent to the contract was obtained by any fraud or 
misrepresentation or that the defendant should not be 
bound by it to the extent to which it is valid at law, 
we are clearly of the opinion that it is of such a character 
that the plaintiff has no right to call upon a court of 
equity to give it the relief it has sought to obtain in 
this suit, 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2, Appellants had failed to satisfactorily perfol'.1ll their 
portion of the contract, 
Professor Corbin, at Volume 5(a) page 301, Specific 
Performance Section 1175 states: 
In the case of a bilateral contract in which the 
promised performances constitute an agreed exchange of 
equivalence, one who has himself broken his promise in 
some material respect cannot get a decree of specific 
perfol'.TI\ance. 
I A court of equity, if it is to require a defendant to per'.:1 
his contract with exactness and specificity, may ligitimately 
require that the plaintiff to have perfol'.1lled his obligations •,11:] 
the same kind of exactness and specificity. Recently the cour:I 
which Appellant and Respondent are now before held in Fischer 
vs, Johnson, 525 P,2d, 45 (1974) as follows: 
But it is also true that Specific Performance is 
a remedy of equity; and one who envokes it must have 
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, he 
must take care to discharge his own duties under the 
contract; and he cannot rely on any mere inconvenience 
as an excuse for his failure to do so, Even if inconven· . 
ience or difficulty is encountered, he must make an effor.t.I 
to perform or tender performance, which manifests reasonai.' 
diligence and a bonified desire to keep his own promises, 
The lower court in the case now before this court made the foll: 
finding of fact in paragraph 12 on page 6 of Findings of fact ;;:j 
: 
Conclusions of Law: 
That defendants have not kept the terms of 
the lease in that they have failed to pay lease 
payments as due, water assessment charges due, 
and property taxes defendants were required to pay 
by the terms of the lease. 
-14-
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The Malones having failed to perform with exactness 
and good faith, the terms of the lease and option agreement. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
require the Ottesons to specifically perform their covenants 
and promises under the Lease and Option Agreement. 
The appellants in their brief, point I, argue that 
the parole evidence rule prevents the court from considering 
anything but the "four corners of the written instrument" 
in its determination of a defense to specific performance. 
This is a complete misstatement of the law of specific 
performance. In Free vs, Little (supra) and McNeil vs. 
McNeil (supra) the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
The right to specific performance depends 
not upon hard fast rules according to which all 
cases are to be decided, but each case is dependent 
upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 
(Emphasis added) 
In ~hamber vs. Livermore (supra) the same question was 
presented to the court, resulting in the following comment 
by that court: 
Complainant however, insists that all the parole 
proof introduced to show that the reservation was 
agreed upon as alleged in the answer, was incompet7nt. 
This objection is untenable, Without now approaching 
the mooted question, whether a complainant can be 
allowed to show by parole a mistake in a contract, 
with a view to having it reformed and then enforced, 
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it is sufficient for us to say there is no dispute 
in the authorities that the mistake may be shown ~ 
parole, as a defense to specific performance of the 
written instrument, See 1 Lead. Cas. in eq. 519 
(Margi) Note, and cases cited. 
The Trial court in its equity jurisdiction over the specific 
performance of the option did properly consider the circumstanc" 
··1 
surrounding the contract and its execution and properly exercis€! 
its discretion in denying specific performance. 
POINT II 
THE COURTS RULINGS WERE PROPERLY BASED 
ON EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT AT TRIAL. 
I 
I 
I 
The tryer of fact may consider all of the facts and circ1Dst; 
which may have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of an;· I 
witnesses' statement and is not bound to give equal credibilit;J 
! 
all witnesses. Gittens vs. Lundber9:_, 3 Utah 2d., 392, 284 P.ld j 
1115 (1955), The record on appeal including the trial transcri:1 
I 
shows the following which support the major findings of fact j 
made by the court: 
a. As to the 
present to see each 
testimony appears. 
age and heal th of the parties, the court wao ! 
party for itself and in addition, the folic•j 
Mr. Cassity asked (at trial transcript pac< I 
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43,) why Nellie Otteson had not accompanied Ara to the office 
of Boyd Bunnell. 
A. She wasn't able to go. 
Q. Why not? 
A, Crippled up. Not feeling well. 
Q. She has pretty much been an invalid for many years? 
A. Yes sir. 
At trial transcript page 222 the following dialogue appears in 
direct examination: 
Q, How is it, that you are taking care of your wife today 
and yesterday? 
A. Well it is very hard work. 
Q, No, I am saying who takes care of her? 
A. My sister, Mrs. Collard. 
Q, And who took care of her yesterday? 
A. Mrs, Fox, 
Q, Relief Society President? 
A, Yes sir. 
b. Bearing on the finding of fact that Ara Otteson farmed 
the 28 acres with his father and had been a farmer on the land for 
his entire life time is the following dialogue appearing in the 
trial transcript at page 41: 
Q, And is it true that on the 28.2 acres you had your home? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And that is where you and Mrs. Otteson reside? 
A. Yes, 
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Q. And is it true that over the years through inheritar.:,i 
from your forebears that you obtained the title to l;.i 
property? 
A. Yes, 
Q, Now did you farm this ground for many years? 
A. Yes. 
At page 56 of the trial transcript, appears the follow-
ing: 
Q, Do you have any personal judgment - how many years 
did you farm Mr, Otteson? 
A. Several years. I farmed since about 30, 1930. 
Q. From 1930 to when. 
A. 1972. 
c. As to the courts findings that plaintiffs did orally 
agree to enter into a lease of the land to the defendants, the 
following testimony appears beginning on the 11th line of page 
41 of the trial transcript. 
Q, How long was it before that date that you first talle: 
about the lease on the 28 acres or was it about that 
time? 
A. It was in March. About the 21st. 
Q, And who started talking about the lease? 
A, Malones. 
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THE COURT: Speak as loud as you can. 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q. And Mr. Otteson, will you tell us how that happened? Did 
they come to you or did you go to them? Tell us what 
happened? 
A. First started out. 
Q. Excuse me, 
A. They came to us about the lease. 
Q, In your home? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q. Alright, did you ever offer to lease the property 
to them before they came to you? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Alright, and they came down to your little mobile 
home? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q, And will you tell us what was said to the best of your 
ability? 
A. They would like to lease the 28 acres. 
Q, And did you agree to do so? 
A. Yes, we talked it over. 
Q, And did you come to a decision that you were willing 
to lease them the 28,2 acres? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q, How many conferences did you have between March and June 
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about your leasing them and them leasing from 
28 acres? 
A. Several, I don't -
Q, Do you know just how many? 
A. No. 
you tr.: I 
i 
I 
d. As to Mr. Otteson's hearing disability, the followir.:1 
I 
testimony appears beginning at the bottom of page 43 of the tr·, 
'"I 
transcript: 
I 
Q, And when you got to Mr. Bunnell' s office, did You h-,J 
'·1 
occasion to have a conversation with Mrs. Malone, wit:I 
Mr, Bunnell? I 
A. Yes sir. 
Q, And could you hear? 
A, Not. No. 
Q, Why not? 
A. Didn't have any batteries for my hearing aid. 
Q, Why did you go see Mr. Bunnell if you couldn't 
hear? 
A. Well I expected them every day but. I ordered 
new ones but didn't get them. 
Q. I see, So when you got there, did, do you remember 
anything that was said between Mr. Bunnell and Mrs. 
Malone? 
A, '.I was introduced to Mr. Bunnell. Said would like to 
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have a little service done. Making out some papers. 
Q, Do you remember anything else during that meeting 
which was said? 
A. Mrs, Malone done most of the talking, I didn't. 
Q. Did you hear what was said? 
A, Part of it, yes. 
Q. Part of it you heard? 
A. Very little, 
Q. Very little? 
A. Yes. 
On page 45 beginning with the fourth line down is the following 
dialogue regarding the meeting at Mr. Bunnell's office: 
Q. Did you at any time hear any mention of the word 
option? 
A, No, 
Q. Never heard the word mentioned? 
A. Not at this meeting, 
Q. Now before you went to that meeting, had the word option 
ever been mentioned by Mr. & Mrs, Malone or you and Mrs. 
Otteson during the time you met in March to June, 1974? 
A. NO sir. 
Q. Never? 
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A. NO sir. 
Q Had Mr. & Mrs. Malone ever told you that in connectir-1 
·1 
leasing the property that they wanted to buy it? 
A. NO sir. 
Q. Or they wanted the right if they chose to buy it? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Absolutely not? 
A. That's right, 
At page 114 the trial transcript on cross examination 
of Boyd Bunnell reflects the following: 
Q. But in any case, Mr. Otteson did very little 
to participate in the discussion? 
A. That is true. 
e. As to the court's finding that the respondents 
at no time discussed sale or option to purchase with Mr. 
Bunnell or the Malones, the trial transcript reflects 
the following testimony of Mr, Bunnell at page 116, 
last paragraph: 
MR. CASSITY: 
Q. Just one further question in light of that, your 
honor, Mr. Bunnell, is it not true that you at no 
time explained what option to buy as used in that 
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agreement meant to Mr. and Mrs. Otteson? 
A, That is true. 
With regard to the finding of the court that the Ottesons 
understood the option as giving them a first right of refusal 
rather than a straight option, the transcript beginning on 
the bottom of page 46 contains the following testimony: 
Q. Was anyone else present when you tried to decide 
what the option part of the lease said? 
A. No sir, 
Q. Or meant? 
A, No sir. 
Q. Just you and Mrs. Otteson? 
A. just the two of us. 
(Omitted discussion between Court and Counsel for all parties) 
Q. Mr. Otteson, with regard to the option provision 
of the lease, what did you intend that that would 
give Mr. and Mrs. Malone? 
A, The right to run the farm. under the lease. We didn't 
expect to have it, to sell 
nothing about the option. 
any time, 
Q. At any time? 
A, At any time, 
it. Nothing was said, 
Never talked option. at 
Q. Well did you ever discuss what the provision meant 
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with Mr. and Mrs. Malone before you signed the lease: 
A. NO sir. 
Q. Did it ever occur to you that that provision might ~e:· 
that if the Malones wanted to buy the property, thei· 
could do so? 
A. No sir. I never -understood it that way. 
Q. Well now, Mr. Otteson, did you and Nellie sign this 
lease? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q, And you thought it was a five year lease? 
A, Yes sir. 
(More discussion between counsel and court) 
Q, What right did you believe the option gave Mr. and 
Mrs. Malone? 
A. The right to sell the place. 
THE COURT: The right to what? 
A, Sell the place, 
THE COURT: The right to sell the place did you say? 
A. Under the option the way I have been instructed now. 
Q, Who had the right to sell the place? 
A, We had the right to sell it. 
r • d · · between the cour'. 1 ,Omitting more material involving iscussions 
and counsel) 
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Q. Alright. You said that you thought the option allowed 
you to sell the place while the lease was going on, is 
that right? 
A. After we got acquainted with the lease but we never 
understood the option. That we had to sell it at any 
time or price, 
At the beginning at the bottom of page 72 the trial transcript 
demonstrates the following testimony: 
Q. Alright, then before you went over to Bunnell did you 
then reach an agreement between you on what the terms 
and conditions would be? 
A. On all but the option, 
Q, You claim the option wasn't discussed between you? 
A. Yes sir, 
Q, Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. No time was it, 
At page 85 the bottom paragraph, a portion of Mr, Ottesons 
deposition is read into the record as follows: 
Q. Now this provision in here about the option and the 
things we have discussed that is what you and Malones agreed to 
is it not? 
A, Yes, partly. 
Q. Well what is the part you didn't agree to? 
A. Not to sell. See we had no conversation about selling 
that farm when he lease it. None whatsoever. At no 
time no sale price was set, Or not any agreement to 
sell our farm. 
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Q. How do ym.i mean that that you didn't agree on any sa;,, 
price but that you did discuss this option provision 
that is in the lease, isn't that true? 
A. That's what :r say, we were friends and we trusted 
them which there was nothing said about them buying 
it until that option they put in the lease. 
Then Mr, Cassity asked Mr. Otteson if this was his true 
tesimony and he answered "that's true." 
Again the trial transcript at page 225 5th line from the bottoc 
states as follows: 
Q. Now when you talked about the lease with Mr. Malone 1 
and Mrs. Malone, did they ever mention to you at any 
time that they wanted to buy the land? 
A. Yes. 
Q, When? 
A. Well when they wanted to lease it. 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I told them no, Both of them. My wife too. 
Q. That you wouldn't sell the land? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you told them at the very beginning? 
A, Yes sir. 
Q, Was there any further discussion about whether they 
-26-
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could buy it after that first meeting? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Never again? 
A. Never again. 
Q. And not in the attorneys office that you are aware of? 
A. No sir, 
On page 227 beginning at line 15 is the following dialogue: 
Q. Let me rephrase that, Did you ever tell Mr. and Mrs. 
Malone that they could buy your property? 
A. No sir. 
Q, Or that they could have an option to buy it at their 
sole discretion? 
A. NO sir. 
f. With respect to the trial courts determination that 
the defendants have not kept the terms of the lease, the 
following testimony is present in the transcript beginning 
10 lines from the bottom of page 63: 
Q. Did the lease require that Mr. Malone pay the water 
assessment each year? 
A. Yes sir, 
Q. Did he pay it in 1976? 
A, No. 
Q. Did you? 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q, And in what amount? 
A, $184. 04. 
Q. Did you tell him that you had paid that water 
assessment? 
A, He came down and I told him I paid it, yes. 
Q. Did you ask for the money back? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. But under the terms of the lease, he owes it, 
is that correct? 
A, That is right. 
On page 131, Sue Malone, under direct examination stated that 
the 1975 lease payment was tendered to the Ottesons but when 
asked by her counsel ''Have you made any other payments?" 
She responded "No sir.''. 
In light of the above, the evidence before the trial 
court was sufficient to support the trial courts findings. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFORMING THE LEASE AND OPTION BY ITS 
VOIDING OF THE OPTION PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The Appellants characterization of the law in Utah as 
to the voiding, reformation or rescission of a con tract clear 
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and unambiguous on its face, is substantially correct. 
In 76 C,J.S. Reformation of Instruments Page 374 it 
states as follows: 
•.• But if the instrument does fail to express 
the real agreement or transaction due either to 
mutual mistake or to mistake, inadvertance, or accident 
on one side, and fraud or inequitable conduct on the 
other, and reformation is essential to give complete 
legal effect to the instrument, it will be allowed. 
(Emphasis added) 
It is not clear to the Respondents according to Utah law 
what other inequitable conduct on the other side would be 
sufficient to allow reformation of a contract where inadvertance 
of one party had resulted in the execution of an unambiguous contract. 
Though by the authority cited by the Appellants, it is clear that 
the Utah Court will countenance reformation if fraud is present. 
The Appellants note that the trial court apparently dismissed 
allegations that there was fraud or duress on the part of the 
Malones, Respondent points out to the court that such language 
of the court was not at final disposition of the case, but 
appears in the transcript to be slightly over one-half of the 
way through the trial. The court could have considered evidence 
which was introduced in the second half of the trial weighed 
with the evidence presented at the first half and come to a 
different conclusion. Given the relative age and infirmity 
of the Respondents compared with the youthfulness of the 
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Appellants and given testimony produced at trial that an optior 
to purchase or an outright sale of the land was never dis-
cussed between the parties and given all other circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the lease and option, the 
court may have concluded that there were sufficient inequities 
to justify rescission or reformation of the contract. Whether 
this evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient, in 
light of the wide discretion given the trial court, to 
justify rescission or reformation under Utah Law is for this 
court to decide. 
As to the Appellants claim that Appellant was prejudiced 
by the courts advising the parties to brief the question of 
consideration supporting the option, the Respondents note 
the final words of the trial court as they appear in the trial 
transcript. The last paragraph of page 231 reads as follows: 
Okay, now I will take the case under advisement 
and permit you as I said this morning, to submit 
written memoranda on this question of the option. 
But not only on that, gentlemen. Feel free to discuss 
the matter of damages, what each one of you think about 
the question of damages, Whether the plaintiffs are 
entitled to damages or is not on the other side. ! 
mean go into any issue that you think is relevant and 
imeor~. And give the court the bene~f your view. 
(Emphasis added) 
The court was clearly not limiting the issues which Appell~t 
could argue and no prejudice could have resulted to the Appell~: 
by the submission and argument of points of law which the triai 
court did not consider determinative. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court had before it in live presence 
the parties involved in the case, along with testimony 
showing the unequal capacity of the parties, the execution 
of agreement whose meaning and effect Nas not apparent 
to the Respondents, the less than perfect performance of 
the obligations of the lease and option by the Appellants 
and no intent of the Respondents to sell or alienate 
their property, With these facts in evidence, the 
trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion 
in denying specific performance to the Appellants. To 
require the Ottesons to sell their family farm under such 
conditions would deny the trial courts responsibility to 
do equity. The rulings of the lower court should be 
upheld accordingly. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1978. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
/ /! ~' // ------/'Ti ~/~ 
DONNIE, -d'.fs~ 
J.;STEVEN NEWTON 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
136 South Main Street 
suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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I certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Respondents Brief were mailed, postage prepaid there-
on, on the 2nd day of February, 1977 to the attorneys for 
Appellants, Michael R, Jensen, Frandsen, Keller and Jensen, 
Professional Building, 90 West First North, Price, Utah, 
84501. 
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